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The petitioner, an inmate at Arthurkill Correctional Facility, is currently serving the following terms of imprisonment: five to
fifteen years for manslaughter in the second [*2]degree[FN1]; five to fifteen years for criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree; and two to six years for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. He has commenced the instant CPLR Article 78
proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated January 8, 2008 which denied him discretionary release on parole.
Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner indicates that he has an impeccable institutional record, and that
he possesses an earned eligibility certificate. He points out that he has completed the ART program, the Transitional Program, Phases IIII, ASAT, and ATV. He also obtained a GED degree. He has been employed full time as a porter. According to the petitioner, he has
strong family ties, including a wife and six children and three sisters. The petitioner maintains that the denial of release was based
solely upon the serious nature of the crimes for which he was convicted. He accuses the Parole Board of re-sentencing him to a new
term of imprisonment. He also maintains that the decision was predetermined. He asserts that the Parole Board failed to consider (in his
words) "the mitigating factors" in this case. In his view, the fact that the sentencing judge imposed a comparatively light sentence for
the homicide, standing alone, should preclude denial of release by the Parole Board. The petitioner also criticizes the Parole Board for
asking questions during his parole interview with regard to his prior criminal history, which he maintains was improper. Incredibly,
notwithstanding the fact that he was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, he makes the following statement in
paragraph 14 of the petition: "In addition, there was no one injured as a result of the underlying crime." The petitioner argues that the
Parole Board failed to consider all of the statutory factors under Executive Law § 259-i. He faults the Parole Board for inquiring into
the facts underlying the crime for which he was incarcerated, even commenting: "[t]o continuously ask an individual to relive, reenact
and rehash an incident and past criminal behavior is counterproductive and begs for inconsistent responses." The petitioner asserts that
the Parole Board improperly failed to consider his sentencing minutes and the recommendations of the sentencing judge. The petitioner
also criticizes the manner of questioning of members of the Parole Board during the parole interview, describing it as being "negative,
intense, and at times sarcastic". He contends that his rights to Due Process and Equal Protection have been violated; and that the
determination to impose a twenty four month hold was excessive as a matter of law.
The reasons for the respondent's determination to deny petitioner release on parole are set forth as follows:
"Despite earned eligibility certificate, parole is denied for the following reasons: [*3]After a careful review of your record and this
interview, it is the determination of this panel that if released at this time there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and
remain at liberty without violating the law and your release at this time is incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community.
This decision is based on the following factors: The instant offense of manslaughter 2nd, CPW 2nd and CPW 3rd involved you
shooting the victim causing his death. This is an escalation of your criminal history with the propensity for violence. You were
unapprehended for several years where you fled to Maryland. You express no remorse for the victim. You minimize your involvement
and responsibility.
"Note is made of your positive programing and disciplinary record. However, discretionary release is inappropriate at this time."
As stated in Executive Law §259-i (2) (c) (A):
"Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness
of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including
program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release
plans including community resources, employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any
deportation order issued by the federal government against the inmate []; (v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or
the victim's representative []" (Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v
Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 2004]; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 2001]). If the
parole board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, the board's determination is not subject to judicial
https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_51298.htm
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review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part of
the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to
disturb the discretionary determination made by [*4]the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its decision and its determination was supported
by the record. A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to
such factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. The decision was sufficiently
detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law §259-i (see
Matter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Green v. New York
State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 1993]). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the
seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907
[3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d
863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 1997]; Matter
of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 1998]). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each
factor that it considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Wise v New York State
Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 2008]). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first
sentence of Executive Law § 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 2006]). In other words, "
[w]here appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining
whether the individual will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,' whether his or her release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society,' and whether release will deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law'" (Matter of
Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 2004], quoting Executive Law §259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a guarantee of release (Matter of Dorman v New
York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3rd Dept., 2006]; Matter of Pearl v New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd
Dept., 2006]).
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re-sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clauses's prohibition against multiple punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State Parole
Board, 227 AD2d 751 [3rd Dept., 1996]; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d
672 [3rd Dept., 2001]; Matter of Evans v Dennison, 13 Misc 3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 2006]). The fact that [*5]an inmate
has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of
Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3rd Dept., 2008]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release
was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 2006] lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 2007]).
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to due process, the Court first observes that there
is no inherent right to parole under the constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates of
the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [1979]; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73,
supra). It has been repeatedly held that Executive Law § 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by the Parole Board's exercise of its
discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169, 171 [2d Cir., 2001]; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 2001];
Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661, 664 [2d Cir., 1979]; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-1368 [SD NY, 1981]; Matter of
Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 2005];
Matter of Lozada v New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 2007]). The Court, accordingly, finds no due
process violation.
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With respect to petitioner's equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution forbids States from
denying to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable
classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 451 US 648, 68 L Ed 2d 514, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [1981]).
Where the action under review does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but
rather is examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal protection clause (see, Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 49 L Ed 2d 520, 524, 96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250). In this
instance there is simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's determination was motivated by
impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New York, 274 F3d 740, 751 [2nd Cir., 2001]). In addition, because "New York
courts addressing a state equal protection claim will ordinarily afford the same breadth of coverage conferred by federal courts under
the US Constitution in the same or similar matters" (Brown v State of New York, 45 AD3d 15, 20-21 [2007 [3rd Dept., 2007], quoting
Brown v State of New York, 9 AD3d 23, 27 [2004]), the Court discerns no violation of NY Const art 1 § 11. The Court finds the
argument to have no merit. [*6]
With regard to the Parole Board's alleged failure to consider the sentencing minutes, it appears that both sets of sentencing minutes
were a part of the record before the Parole Board at the time the instant determination was made. In addition, the Court observes that
the statute requires that the Parole Board consider the recommendations of the sentencing court (see Executive Law 259-i [2] [c] [A]
last sentence, which makes reference to the provisions of Executive Law § 259-i [1] [a]). In this instance, a review of both sets of
sentencing minutes reveals that, contrary to the assertions of the petitioner, the sentencing court made no recommendation with regard
to release of the petitioner upon expiration of his minimum term of imprisonment. Thus, even if it were true that the Parole Board did
not consider the sentencing minutes, the Court would conclude that such failure was harmless (see Matter of Schettino v New York State
Div. of Parole, 45 AD3d 1086, 1086-1087 [3rd Dept., 2007]).
The Court discerns no evidence in the record to support the petitioner's assertion that the parole decision was predetermined.
Lastly, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) is within the Board's discretion and was
supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002], lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law,
irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are returned to the attorney for the respondent who
is directed to enter this Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this Decision/Order with notice
of entry.
ENTER
Dated: May 28, 2009/s/ George B. Ceresia, Jr.Troy, New YorkSupreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Footnotes
Footnote 1:The Court observes that the petitioner was originally convicted of depraved indifference murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]).
The Court of Appeals modified the conviction by reducing it to manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]), and by
remitting the case to Supreme Court for re-sentencing (see People v Atkinson, 7 NY3d 765 [2006]).
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